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State Party Competition Reconsidered 
GERARD s. GRYSKI 
Emory University 
Introduction 
Political scientists have devoted a considerable amount of attention to 
devising various measures or classificatory schemes of state interparty competi-
tion (ipc ).1 These endeavors served a useful heuristic purpose and assisted in 
characterizing the complexion of state ipc generally, two functions significant 
especially in the developmental stages of the literature on state parties .2 
Too often, though , these conceptual initiatives lacked focus. Classificatory 
systems can be evaluated properly only by reference to the larger purposes they 
are to serve. That is, these constructs are not ends in themselves but rather are 
research tools designed to assist in the investigation of more pervasive political 
phenomena. 3 Such a focus materialized in the state policy literature ,4 one aspect 
of which sought to assess the relative effectiveness of socioeconomic and 
political factors (e.g., ipc ) in explaining interstate policy variation. This "policy 
focus" now is a central consideration of research on state politics. It is possible, 
therefore , to specify two criteria for the evaluation of various ipc measures: 1) 
their ability to portray accurately the character of political competition in the 
states , and; 2) the ease and precision - both practical and theoretical-of their 
incorporation into the current structure of research on state political systems. 
We wish here to argue concerning the deficiencies of previous measures of ipc, 
and, in addition, present a new measure which overcomes most of these 
shortcomings . 
• Special thanks to Randall Guynes and Allen DeCotiis for their comments on an earlier version of 
this article. 
1 See, for example: Robert Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party 
Strength ," Western Political Quarterly 11 (September , 1958); Mark Stern, "'Measuring Interparty 
Competition: A Proposal and a Test of a Method," journal of Politics 34 (August, 1972); Austin 
Ranney , "Pa rties in State Politics," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), Politics in the 
American States (Boston: Little , Brown, 1965); Richard L. Hofferbert , "C lassification of American 
State Party Systems," Journal of Politics 26 (August, 1964). 
2 On this point see Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall , "T he American Party Systems," 
American Political Science Review 48 (June, 1954): 477. 
3 See Hofferber! , op. cit., p. 550. 
'The relevant literatur e is now rather extensive. A representative sampling would include: 
Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-party Competition , Economic Variables, and 
Welfare Policies in the American States," Journal of Politics 23 (May, 1963); Thomas R. Dye, 
Politics, Economics and the Public (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); Ira Sharkansky, "Economic 
and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant 
Cases," Midwest Journal of Political Science 11 (May, 1967); Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. 
McCrone, "Par ty Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," American Political 
Science Review 63 (September , 1963); Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters. "'The Politics of 
Redistribution ," American Political Science Review 64 (June, 1970); Brian R. Fry, "Jnterparty 
Comrtition and Redistribution : Theme and Variation ," journal of Political Science 3 (Spring , 
1976 . 
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Deficiencies of Previous Indices 
With the above two criteria in mind, two classes of problems - technical 
and theoretical - become apparent in the various ipc indices extant in the 
literature. 
Dawson and Robinson indicated three major technical problem areas -
time periods considered, offices included, and the ways of looking at competi-
tion within the context of the first two factors. 5 The time period selected for the 
competition index should roughly coincide with the time period of the policy 
data .6 Concentration upon one office is unreliable. 7 And if the states are to be 
treated as policy "systems," then measures which include non-state races (e.g., 
U. S. Senators) are unsatisfactory ,8 regardless of how useful they may be for 
indicating the general contours of state party competition. Further, while state 
legislators are pivotal policy actors, consideration of these offices is often 
excluded. 9 Finally , several measures resort to either placing the states into 
various competitive categories 10 or rank ordering the states according to the 
degree of ipc. 11 But the categories are sometimes rather crude, often not 
logically distinct, and usually obscure subtle but important distinctions among 
the states in any given category. Rank ordering can be misleading if the states 
happen to fall in clusters, and it does not permit complex statistical operations as 
would be the case if the data were presented in interval form. 
A more serious technical problem concerns the manner in which legislative 
competition is usually measured . Several of the measures employed in state 
policy research 12 have focused on three aspects of ipc: one minus the percentage 
of the popular vote of the victorious gubernatorial candidate, and one minus the 
percentage of seats won by the majority party in each house of the state 
legislature . Though having the advantages of data availability and ease of 
measurement, this approach can distort the actual situation of party conflict in 
the states . It is possible, for example, that a legislature having , say, 100 seats 
could be divided equally between the two parties . Yet it is also logically possible 
5 Op. cit ., p. 271. 
6 This procedure was not followed , for example, by Dye in his influential work , op. cit . There , 
he used political data from the Fifties to study policy decisions of the Sixties. A different aspect of the 
"time factor'" issue concerns the "'pendulum effect," the importance of which was argued by Joseph 
A. Schlesinger in "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying States According to the degree of 
Inter-Party Competition ," American Political Science Review 50 (December , 1955), and "The 
Structure of Competition for Office in the United States ," Behavioral Science 5 (July, 1960). A 
critique of the pendulum notion can be found in David Pfeiffer , "The Measurement of Inter-Party 
Com'?:tition and Systemic Stability," American Political Science Review 61 (June , 1967): 460-61. 
This was done by : V. 0 . Key, Jr ., American State Politics: An Introduction ( ew York: 
Alfred A. Knopf , 1956), and Schlesinger , "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying States 
According to the Degree of Inter-Party Competition ," op. cit . 
8 For example Hofferbert, op. cit . 
9 For example Schlesinger, "The Structure of Competition for Office in the United States, " op. 
cit ., and Pfeiffer , op. cit . 
10 This procedure was followed by , among others , John H. Fenton , People and Parties in 
Politics (Glenview , Ilinois: Scott, Foresman and Company , 1966); Golembiewski , op. cit .; Duane 
Lockard , "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs , .. in Oliver Garceau (ed .), Political Research and 
Political Theory (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1968). 
11 See Hofferbert, op. cit . 
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that each of these elections was uncontested by one of the parties . Thus this 
approach would classify this situation as one of "perfect" competition, clearly a 
distortion of actual competitive conditions. While this admittedly is a rather 
extreme example, it is usually the case that a substantial proportion of legislative 
elections are decided by lopsided margins . 
The theoretical problem concerns the linkage of these previous ipc con-
structs. It will be recalled that the impetus for this literature was the "Key 
theory," which stated the ipc exerts an intervening influence between state 
economic conditions and state spending for "redistributive issues. "13 Candi-
dates in competitive districts will favor a greater level and range of public 
services in an attempt to secure the votes of the large middle and lower middle 
class voter blocs. The crucial linkage, then , is between the degree of competition 
and public policy. Previous ipc measures, by counting legislative seats already 
won by the parties, totally ignore the extent of competition in the actual 
legislative elections. In effect, previous indices are measures of "legislative or 
parliamentary" competition rather than "electoral" competition. These mea-
sures therefore suffer from a theoretical deficiency since the Key theory posits 
an electoral rather than a parliamentary linkage between competition and 
policy. 
A Proposed New Measure 
One method of overcomin the problems of measuring legislative com-
petition- 1scusse a ove would be to ca culate the average vote of all candidates 
of the victorious party in the elections for both houses of the legislatures. This 
would in a way be similar. to the previous measures but instead would focus on 
the extent of competition in each legislative district. While this approach is 
preferred over previous measures, it still would not overcome a serious problem 
common to both approaches . For example, according to a distribution of seats 
measure of ipc both New York and Illinois are highly competitive states.14 
However, most races are in fact not highly contested, with Democrats control-
ling Cook County and Republicans controlling downstate in Illinois, and 
Democrats controlling New York City and Republicans controlling upstate in 
New York. These conditions could be identified by an ipc measure which 
focused on individual legislative races, but by averaging the vote of all the 
candidates of the victorious party these non-competitive conditions within the 
state would cancel each other out , once again producing a highly competi tive 
score. In effect such indices are actually measures of one-party dominance 
rather than measures of interparty competition. 
A new ipc measure is proposed here, one that is theoretically sound in that 
it is addressed to competition in each legislative district, and is capable of 
12 For example , Dawson and Robinson, op. cit ., and Dye, op. cit . 
13 V. 0 . Key, Jr., Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), especially pp. 
288-311 . 
14 See, for example , Ranney , op. cit . 
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identifying the actual patterns of competition in the states . This new measure 
has thre~ components the average of which cepcesents a composite ipe-im:lex: 
1. one minus the proportion of the popular vote of the victorious guber-
natorial candidate; 
2. one minus the average vote of all victorious candidates in elections for 
the upper house of the state legislature , and; 
3. one minus the average vote of all victorious candidates in elections for 
the lower house of the state legislature . 
The major shift entailed by this new measure is that attention is focused on 
the extent of competition in state legislative races regardless of party . This 
approach is preferable for technical reasons because it avoids the kind of 
problems posed by the Illinois and New York examples. More important is the 
fact that this technique is superior in theoretical terms . The Key linkage is 
addressed to the degree of party competition in a state political system rather 
than the extent of one-party dominance . Perhaps this point was obscured in 
subsequent applications of the linkage due to the fact that Key described politics 
in the South at a time when one-party dominance and interparty competition 
meant essentially the same thing . When applied outside the South in a different 
historical period , however, this distinction becomes crucial , both empirically 
and theoretically . And we argue that only by focusing on the idea of competi-
tion (regardless of party) as described above can we: a) measure the extent of 
actual political competition in the states , and b) construct an ipc index amenable 
to the framework of contemporary research on comparative state public policy . 
Appendix 
This new ipc measure can be represented algebraically as follows: 
n m 
g + 1 / n s; + 1 / m h; 
ipc = 1 ______ i=_l ____ i=_l __ 
3 
where g = proportion of the vote received by winning gubernatorial candidate 
n = number of races for the upper house of the state legislature 
s; = proportion of the vote of the winning candidate in the "j th " race 
m = number of races for the lower house of the state legislature 
h; = propor-tion of the vote of the winning candidate in the '' j th " race 
